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Abstract. We propose and examine the usability and security of Cued
Click Points (CCP), a cued-recall graphical password technique. Users
click on one point per image for a sequence of images. The next image
is based on the previous click-point. We present the results of an initial
user study which revealed positive results. Performance was very good in
terms of speed, accuracy, and number of errors. Users preferred CCP to
PassPoints (Wiedenbeck et al., 2005), saying they thought that selecting
and remembering only one point per image was easier, and that seeing
each image triggered their memory of where the corresponding point
was located. We also suggest that CCP provides greater security than
PassPoints because the number of images increases the workload for
attackers.
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1 Introduction
Various graphical password schemes [13] have been proposed as alternatives to
text-based passwords. Research and experience have shown that text-based pass-
words are fraught with both usability and security problems that make them less
than desirable solutions [20]. Psychology studies have revealed that the human
brain is better at recognizing and recalling images than text [7]; graphical pass-
words are intended to capitalize on this human characteristic in hopes that by
reducing the memory burden on users, coupled with a larger full password space
offered by images, more secure passwords can be produced and users will not
resort to unsafe practices in order to cope.
In this paper, we propose a new click-based graphical password scheme called
Cued Click Points (CCP). It can be viewed as a combination of PassPoints [18,
19], Passfaces [8], and Story [5]. A password consists of one click-point per image
for a sequence of images. The next image displayed is based on the previous click-
point so users receive immediate implicit feedback as to whether they are on the
correct path when logging in. CCP offers both improved usability and security.
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2 Cued Click Points
We conducted an in-lab user study with 24 participants and a total of 257
trials. Users had high success rates, could quickly create and re-enter their
passwords, and were very accurate when entering their click-points. Partici-
pants rated the system positively and indicated that they preferred CCP to
a PassPoints-style system. They also said that they appreciated the immedi-
ate implicit feedback telling them whether their latest click-point was correctly
entered.
A preliminary security analysis of this new scheme is also presented. Hotspots [15]
(i.e. areas of the image that users are more likely to select) are a concern in
click-based passwords, so CCP uses a large set of images that will be difficult for
attackers to obtain. For our proposed system, hotspot analysis requires propor-
tionally more effort by attackers, as each image must be collected and analyzed
individually. CCP appears to allow greater security than PassPoints; the work-
load for attackers of CCP can be arbitrarily increased by augmenting the number
of images in the system. As with most graphical passwords, CCP is not intended
for environments where shoulder-surfing is a serious threat.
Section 2 provides background information on related techniques. Cued Click
Points (CCP) is described in Section 3, the user study and its results are available
in Sections 4 and 5 respectively, and an initial security analysis is given in Section
6. Section 7 provides an interpretation and discussion of the results including
possible enhancements, while conclusions and future work appear in Section 8.
2 Background and Related Work
Graphical password schemes can be grouped into three general categories based
on the type of cognitive activity required to remember the password: recogni-
tion, recall, and cued recall [?,11]. Recognition is the easiest for human memory
whereas pure recall is most difficult since the information must be accessed from
memory with no triggers. Cued recall falls somewhere between these two as it
offers a cue which should establish context and trigger the stored memory [11].
Among existing graphical passwords, CCP most closely resembles aspects
of Passfaces [8], Story [5], and PassPoints [18, 19]. Therefore these graphical
password schemes are presented in more detail. Conceptually, CCP is a blend of
the three; in terms of implementation, it is most similar to PassPoints. It also
avoids the complex user training requirements found in a number of graphical
password proposals, such as that of Weinshall [17].
Passfaces [8] is a graphical password scheme based primarily on recognizing
human faces. During password creation, users select a number of images from a
larger set. To log in, users must identify one of their pre-selected images from
amongst several decoys. Users must correctly respond to a number of these chal-
lenges for each login. Davis et al. [5] implemented their own version called Faces
and conducted a long-term user study. Results showed that users could accu-
rately remember their images but that user-chosen passwords were predictable
to the point of being insecure.
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Davis et al. [5] proposed an alternative scheme, Story, that used everyday
images instead of faces and required that users select their images in the cor-
rect order. Users were encouraged to create a story as a memory aid. It fared
somewhat worse than Faces for memorability [5], but user choices were much
less predictable.
The idea of click-based graphical passwords originated with Blonder [2] who
proposed a scheme where a password consisted of a series of clicks on prede-
fined regions of an image. Later, Wiedenbeck et al. [18, 19] proposed PassPoints,
wherein passwords could be composed of several (e.g. five) points anywhere on an
image. They also proposed a “robust discretization” scheme [1], with three over-
lapping grids, allowing for login attempts that were approximately correct to be
accepted and converting the entered password into a cryptographic verification
key.
Wiedenbeck et al. [18, 19] examined the usability of PassPoints in three sep-
arate in-lab user studies to compare text passwords to PassPoints, test whether
the choice of image impacted usability, and determine the minimum size of the
tolerance square. The overall conclusion was that PassPoints was a usable au-
thentication scheme.
We recently conducted two user studies [3] on a PassPoints-style system. Our
initial lab study revisited the original usability claims, explored usability of such
passwords on a wider range of images (17 images), and gathered information
about users’ password choices. Next, we conducted a large-scale field study that
examined click-based graphical passwords in practice.
Intuitively, it seems obvious that some areas of an image are more attractive
to users as click-points [12]. If this phenomenon is too strong, the likelihood
that attackers can guess a password significantly increases. If attackers learn
which images are being used, they can select a set of likely hotspots through
image processing tools or by observing a small set of users on the target image
and then building an attack dictionary based on those points [15]. For further
discussion, see Section 6.
3 Cued Click Points
The Cued Click Points (CCP) scheme is a proposed alternative to PassPoints. In
CCP, users click on one point on each of c = 5 images rather than on five points
on one image. It offers cued-recall and introduces visual cues that instantly alert
valid users if they have made a mistake when entering their latest click-point
(at which point they can cancel their attempt and retry from the beginning).
It also makes attacks based on hotspot analysis more challenging, as we discuss
later. As shown in Figure 1, each click results in showing a next-image, in effect
leading users down a “path” as they click on their sequence of points. A wrong
click leads down an incorrect path, with an explicit indication of authentication
failure only after the final click. Users can choose their images only to the extent
that their click-point dictates the next image. If they dislike the resulting images,
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they could create a new password involving different click-points to get different
images.
Fig. 1. CCP passwords can be regarded as a choice-dependent path of images
We envision that CCP fits into an authentication model where a user has
a client device (which displays the images) to access an online server (which
authenticates the user). We assume that the images are stored server-side with
client communication through SSL/TLS. For further discussion, see Section 6.
For implementation, CCP initially functions like PassPoints. During pass-
word creation, a discretization method (e.g. see [1]) is used to determine a
click-point’s tolerance square and corresponding grid. For each click-point in
a subsequent login attempt, this grid is retrieved and used to determine whether
the click-point falls within tolerance of the original point. With CCP, we further
need to determine which next-image to display.
Similar to the PassPoints studies, our example system had images of size
451x331 pixels and tolerance squares of 19x19 pixels. If we used robust dis-
cretization [1], we would have 3 overlapping candidate grids each containing
approximately 400 squares and in the simplest design, 1200 tolerance squares
per image (although only 400 are used in a given grid). We use a function
f(username, currentImage, currentT oleranceSquare) that uniquely maps each
tolerance square to a next-image. This suggests a minimum set of 1200 images
required at each stage. One argument against using fewer images, and having
multiple tolerance squares map to the same next-image, is that this could po-
tentially result in misleading implicit feedback in (albeit rare) situations where
users click on an incorrect point yet still see the correct next-image.
Each of the 1200 next-images would have 1200 tolerance squares and thus
require 1200 next-images of their own. The number of images would quickly
become quite large. So we propose re-using the image set across stages. By re-
using images, there is a slight chance that users see duplicate images. During
the 5 stages in password creation, the image indices i1, ..., i5 for the images in
the password sequence are each in the range 1 ≤ ij ≤ 1200. When computing
the next-image index, if any is a repeat (i.e. the next ij is equal to ik for some
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k < j), then the next-image selection function f is deterministically perturbed
to select a distinct image.
A user’s initial image is selected by the system based on some user char-
acteristic (as an argument to f above; we used username). The sequence is
re-generated on-the-fly from the function each time a user enters the password.
If a user enters an incorrect click-point, then the sequence of images from that
point onwards will be incorrect and thus the login attempt will fail. For an at-
tacker who does not know the correct sequence of images, this cue will not be
helpful.
We expect that hotspots [15] will appear as in PassPoints, but since the
number of images is significantly increased, analysis will require more effort
which increases proportionally with the configurable number of images in the
system. For example, if attackers identify thirty likely click-points on the first
image, they then need to analyze the thirty corresponding second images (once
they determine both the indices of these images and get access to the images
themselves), and so on, growing exponentially.
A major usability improvement over PassPoints is the fact that legitimate
users get immediate feedback about an error when trying to log in. When they see
an incorrect image, they know that the latest click-point was incorrect and can
immediately cancel this attempt and try again from the beginning. The visual
cue does not explicitly reveal “right” or “wrong” but is evident using knowledge
only the legitimate user should possess. As with text passwords, PassPoints can
only safely provide feedback at the end and cannot reveal the cause of error.
Providing explicit feedback in PassPoints before the final click-point could allow
PassPoints attackers to mount an online attack to prune potential password
subspaces, whereas CCP’s visual cues should not help attackers in this way.
Another usability improvement is that being cued to recall one point on each of
five images appears easier than remembering an ordered sequence of five points
on one image.
4 User Study
We conducted an in-lab user study of CCP with 24 participants. The method-
ology was reviewed and approved by the university’s research ethics committee.
The participants (12 females and 12 males) were university students with diverse
backgrounds. None were specifically studying computer security but all were reg-
ular web users. They ranged in age from 17 to 26 years. Two had participated
in our previous in-lab study [3], testing a PassPoints-style system.
All participants completed an individual one-hour session in our usability lab.
They first read and signed the consent form and were given an introduction to the
tasks they would be completing during the session. This introduction included
showing them an example image with superimposed squares, demonstrating how
accurate they needed to be when re-entering their points. The tolerance squares
used in this study were 19x19 pixels. We also explained that the next image
in the sequence depended on where they clicked on the current image. They
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were told that if they suddenly saw an image they did not recognize during the
Confirm or Login phases, then they were likely on the wrong path. Participants
completed two practice trials followed by at most 12 real trials. In total, 257 real
CCP trials were completed.
A trial consisted of the following steps. The phases indicated in steps 1, 2,
and 5 represent the password phases used in later analysis.
1. Create phase: Create a password by clicking on one point in each of five
system-selected images presented in sequence.
2. Confirm phase: Confirm this password by re-entering it correctly. Users in-
correctly confirming their password could retry the confirmation or return
to Step 1. A new password started with the same initial image, but generally
included different images thereafter, depending on the click-points.
3. Two questions: Answer two 10-point Likert-scale questions on the computer
about their current password’s ease of creation and predicted memorability
4. Complete MRT: Complete a Mental Rotations Test (MRT) puzzle [9]. This
paper-based task was used to distract users for a minimum of 30 seconds by
giving them a visual task to complete in order to clear their working memory.
5. Login phase: Log in with their current password. If users noticed an error
during login, they could cancel their login attempt and try again. Alterna-
tively, if they did not know their password, they could create a new password,
effectively returning to Step 1 of the trial with the same initial image as a
starting point. If users felt too frustrated with the particular images to try
again, they could skip this trial and move on to the next trial.
Participants completed as many trials as they wished in the one-hour session,
to a maximum of 14 (2 practice + 12 real trials). At the midpoint, participants
took a break and completed a demographics questionnaire. The last ten minutes
of the session were devoted to completing a Likert-scale and open-ended ques-
tionnaire about their perceptions and opinions of these graphical passwords. For
each participant, data from the two practice trials were discarded, so all results
reported in this paper are based on data from the subsequent trials.
When time remained in the one-hour session, participants were given one
further task: to complete a trial with our PassPoints-style system, where they
selected five points on one image. The experimenter was careful to identify the
second system as “the other system we are looking at” rather than the “old”
system, to not bias participants into thinking that they should rate CCP more
favourably. Users were then asked which version they preferred.
A prototype application was developed in J#. A set of 330 images was com-
piled from personal collections as well as from websites providing free-for-use
images. The prototype system did not hash the passwords or use a discretiza-
tion method as would a real system, but simply stored the exact pixel coordinates
so that the users’ choice of click-points and their accuracy on re-entry could be
examined. The system also implemented an improvised image selection process
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to reduce the size of the required image set since with several unique trials per
participant, we would have needed several thousand images to implement the
proposed scheme. The first time a user clicked on a point, a new image was
associated with that point. If a user clicked within the tolerance region of that
point again, either for re-entering or for resetting a password, the same image
was shown. Once associated with a click-point, an image was not re-used for
any other click-point during the entire session. Only areas where the user clicked
had images associated with them, therefore reducing the total number of images
required while still behaving in a manner consistent with the actual proposed
scheme from the user’s perspective.
Consistent with published PassPoints results, the images were 451x331 pixels
in size and were displayed on a 19-inch screen with its resolution set to 1024x768
pixels. We used tolerance squares of size 19x19 (PassPoints studies report a
20x20 pixel tolerance).
Three methods were used to collect data in this study: system logs, question-
naires, and observations. The system recorded the exact pixel coordinates of each
click-point on every image visited by participants for every Create, Confirm, or
Login attempt, along with the time of each event.
A post-test questionnaire was used to gather information about users’ per-
ceptions and opinions. A second questionnaire was used to collect demographic
data to help frame the results of the study. Users were also asked two online
questions immediately after successfully confirming their password to get an im-
mediate reaction of how easy it was to create the password and how difficult
they expect it would be to remember their password in a week.
Finally, an observer sat with each participant throughout the session, noting
any difficulties or unexpected behaviour as well as comments made by the par-
ticipants. While participants were not instructed to use a talk-aloud protocol,
they were not discouraged from speaking if they had comments as they worked.
Because comments may have slowed down completion times, any questions by
the observer were asked between trials where they would not affect the timings.
5 Collected Results
Restarts. Participants used the reset button as soon as they saw an incorrect
image and realized they were on the wrong path. This effectively cancelled the
current attempt as resetting returned them to the first image where they could
start entering their password again. A few times, participants restarted even
when they saw the correct image because they had forgotten the image. Failed
login attempts (where users pressed the login button and were explicitly told that
their password was incorrect) occurred only when users clicked on the wrong
point for the last image in the series since they did not receive any implicit
feedback for that click-point. Because these were so few, failed login attempts
are included in the restart counts. Participants said that confirming the password
helped them to remember it. Once they had successfully confirmed the password,
logging on even after the distraction task was relatively easy. This fact is reflected
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in Table 1 which shows that the vast majority of restarts occurred during the
Confirm phase.
Table 1. Total number of restarts, success rates, and completion times per phase
Create Confirm Login
Total Number of Restarts 7 101 14
Success Rates 251/257 (98%) 213/257 (83%) 246/257 (96%)
Mean Time (SD)(in seconds) 24.7 (16.4) 10.9 (13.1) 7.4 (5.5)
Median Time (in seconds) 19.1 7.4 6.0
Four participants completed all their trials without any restarts, i.e. they
made no errors during the entire session. In total, 201 of 257 trials (79%) were
completed without restarts in any phase. The success rates were high for all
phases, as shown in Table 1. For each phase, success rates were calculated as the
number of trials completed without errors or restarts over the total number of
trials.
Accuracy. Participants were extremely accurate in re-entering their passwords.
As a measure of accuracy, all individual click-points in the Confirm and Login
phases were evaluated. This totalled 1569 click-points for the Confirm phase
and 1325 click-points for the Login phase. For each point, the accuracy was
computed as the maximum of |xoriginal − xcurrent| and |yoriginal − ycurrent|. All
click-points were considered in the analysis, even those that were unsuccessful. A
few times, participants reached an incorrect image and still proceeded to click on
a point. These were included in the 51+ category since the point was obviously
forgotten. As indicated in Figure 2, 86% of points were within 4 pixels of the
original click-point for the Confirm phase compared to 92% for the Login phase.
Falling within 4 pixels of the original point means that these click-points would
have been accepted within a tolerance square of 9x9 pixels.
Fig. 2. Accuracy for each phase
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Times for Password Entry. As expected, participants took longest to create
their password and then were progressively quicker in entering it during the
Confirm and Login phases. The reported times encompass from the first click in
a phase until the last click, including any restarts. The mean and median times
reflected in Table 1 are slightly elevated because some participants paused to
comment as they were entering their password, which slowed their performance.
Despite this fact, login times are well below 10 seconds and the total time to
create and confirm a CCP password is approximately half a minute, which we
expect would be quite acceptable in many applications or environments.
Questionnaires. Participants completed two sets of Likert-scale questions.
First they answered two online questions immediately after successfully confirm-
ing each of their passwords. They gave the “ease of creating a password” and
“ease of remembering their password in a week” median scores of 5/10 (means of
4.6), where 10 is the most positive answer. Secondly, they completed a post-test
questionnaire at the end of the one-hour session. Ten-point Likert scales were
used, where 1 indicted strong disagreement and 10 equalled strong agreement
with the given statement. In Table 2, we report on a subset of the questions,
corresponding to the questions reported in our study of a PassPoints-style sys-
tem [3]. Some of the questions were inverted to avoid bias; as a result the scores
for the statements marked with (*) were reversed before calculating the means
and medians. A higher score always indicates a more positive result for CCP.
Table 2. Questionnaire responses. Scores are out of 10. * = inverted
Questions Mean Median
I could easily create a graphical password 8.2 8.5
* Someone who knows me would be better at guessing my graphical
password than a stranger
4.4 5
Logging on using a graphical password was easy 7.5 7
Graphical passwords are easy to remember 7.2 6.5
* I prefer text passwords to graphical passwords 3.6 5
* Text passwords are more secure than graphical passwords 4.4 5
I think that other people would choose different points than me for a
graphical password
8.0 8
With practice, I could quickly enter my graphical password 8.3 9
All post-test questionnaire questions had median values of neutral or higher,
with several questions showing high levels of satisfaction. Participants showed
some concern over the perceived security of graphical passwords and indicated a
preference for text-based passwords. Looking at the two online questions shows
that users initially felt that it was somewhat difficult to select passwords. In-
terestingly, by the time they responded to the post-test questionnaire, they felt
much better about password creation. They also showed some hesitation about
whether they would be able to remember their password in a week. This may
have been exacerbated by the fact that they were creating multiple passwords
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in a row and did not feel that they would be able to remember all of them. Ad-
ditionally, in [3] we show that long-term memorability of click-based passwords
did not appear to be an issue.
Preference between CCP and PassPoints. When time permitted, par-
ticipants were introduced to a PassPoints-style system (i.e. 5 clicks on same
image) and asked which they preferred. Ten participants attempted a trial with
the PassPoints-style system. An additional two people had participated in our
earlier study [3]. Of these 12 people, 9 strongly preferred CCP, one preferred
PassPoints, and two felt that PassPoints was easier but that CCP was more
secure.
User Choice. Users were told in the preamble to the session to pretend that
their passwords were protecting bank information and as such they should choose
points that were memorable to them but difficult for others to guess. Users took
these instructions seriously and many commented on how they were avoiding
certain areas because they would be too easy to guess or because they felt that
others would select the same points.
Users developed strategies for selecting their points. Some tried to pick geo-
metric patterns that applied across images such as selecting items in a row along
the bottom of the images, but most talked about picking things that have mean-
ing to them such as their initial from a sign or a familiar toy. One participant
made up elaborate stories about each of the click-points. Users indicated that
they preferred to click on things that were small and “clickable”, such as centers
of letters or circles.
Participants felt strongly about the suitability of some images, with strongest
reactions to images they disliked. They preferred images that were not too clut-
tered, that contained a variety of distinct items, that had small well-defined
areas, and that featured contrasting colors. The most disliked images were those
that were uniform and repetitive, such as a circuit board or field of flowers, that
were highly cluttered, or that had few items with well-defined borders.
6 Preliminary Security Analysis
Any proposed authentication scheme needs to be evaluated in terms of possible
threats. We begin by clarifying our target scenario for CCP and the particular
assumptions made about the system.
We recommend that CCP be implemented and deployed in systems where
oﬄine attacks are not possible, and where any attack will be made against an
online system that can limit the number of guesses made per account in a given
time period (this limit should include restarts as well). This follows related com-
ments by Davis et al. [5] regarding Faces and Story, even though we expect the
security of CCP to be substantially stronger than those schemes. We further as-
sume that all communication between the client and server will be made securely
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through SSL, maintaining secrecy of selected click-points and corresponding im-
ages, therefore avoiding simple attacks based on network sniffing.
We suggest that the image mappings (the mapping of tolerance squares to
next-images based on f) be done on a per-user basis as a function of the user-
name, as a form of salting to complicate the construction of general attack
dictionaries. We also suggest that the image set across all users is a superset
containing a very large number of images and that users are assigned a subset
of these images for their image-maps.
General attacks against such a system, where attackers try to break into any
account [10], are slowed due to the precautions mentioned above. We assume that
the function f would eventually become known to attackers. Hotspot analysis
might be used to increase the efficiency of an attack dictionary but images would
need to be collected and such a dictionary would need to be generated on a per-
user basis. Online attacks against specific users are more worrisome and require
further examination. Even for online systems where the account is locked after
t failed login attempts, non-trivial security is still necessary to guard against
system-wide attacks over W accounts since an attacker gets t ∗ W guesses per
time window [10]. Several scenarios are discussed below.
Shoulder-surfing and other information capture from users. Most graph-
ical passwords are vulnerable to shoulder-surfing attacks [14]. With today’s
small, inexpensive cameras and camera phones, it is easy to video-capture a
user’s screen or keyboard as they are logging in. CCP is also susceptible to
such attacks and indeed in its present form the change in images may be easier
to see from further away than mouse pointer movements in PassPoints. With
knowledge of which images to look for in systems allowing sufficient numbers of
online guesses, attackers could try a brute-force attack of clicking on points until
the correct next image appears and use this in a divide-and-conquer password
recovery.
If the username, the image sequence, and the click-points are observed through
shoulder-surfing then an attacker has all of the information needed to break in
to the account, as is the case with PassPoints and most other password systems.
Having a compromised computer is also a threat because malware may capture
the login information and relay that information elsewhere. Whereas a keylogger
suffices for text passwords, for graphical passwords software is needed to capture
the images and the cursor positions.
When only some of the information is known, it can be used to narrow the
search for a correct guess. With PassPoints, knowing the username is enough to
retrieve the user’s sole image. Hotspot analysis [15] can then be conducted on
that particular image. With CCP, the username and an online guess reveal only
the first image so hotspot analysis of this image gives only limited information
to an attacker.
Knowing some images and their position in a user’s sequence allows prun-
ing of an attack dictionary. The more images are known, the smaller the attack
dictionary and the easier the attacker’s job. Thus CCP is not suitable in en-
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vironments where shoulder-surfing is a realistic threat, or environments where
user images can otherwise be recorded (e.g. by insiders, malicious software on
the client machine, etc.).
Hotspots and dictionary attacks. In cases where attackers are not in a
position to capture information from the user, they are limited to what they can
deduce through image analysis.
Hotspots are specific areas in the image that have a higher probability of
being selected by users as part of their passwords. If attackers can accurately
predict the hotspots in an image, then a dictionary of passwords containing com-
binations of these hotspots can be built. Hotspots are known to be problematic
for PassPoints [15]; further analysis is needed to determine whether precautions
such as carefully selecting images can minimize this threat.
Our example system had 400 tolerance squares per grid for a given image.
Because the chosen grid is stored during password creation, the correct grid is
always retrieved by the system during login so the fact that there are several
grids (and 1200 images) does not come into play. This means that for each
image, there is a 1/400 chance of clicking within the correct tolerance square.
However, due to hotspots some of these have a much higher probability of being
correct than others. Knowing the hotspots would allow an attacker to modify an
attack dictionary to test passwords with higher probability first. For example,
re-examining the data from our larger PassPoints-style study [3] we found that,
as a general result across 17 images used, the 30 largest hotspots on an image
cover approximately 50% of user-chosen click-points. Assuming that attackers
are first able to extract the necessary images and perform hotspot analysis, there
is approximately a 3% (.55) chance that a password is contained in a dictionary
of 225 entries built entirely from hotspots.
A key advantage of CCP over PassPoints is that attackers need to analyze
hotspots on a large set of images rather than only one image since they do not
know the sequence of images used for a given password. Secondly, using different
subsets of images for different users means that an attacker must somehow gather
information about the specific subset assigned to the current user.
Further testing is required to gather a larger sample of click-points per image
for CCP, but preliminary analysis provides evidence that users are no more likely
to select a popular hotspot as their click-point in CCP than with PassPoints.
When presented with the same images, users selected similar points in both our
CCP and PassPoints-style [3] user studies.
7 Further Discussion
From a usability point of view, CCP appears quite successful. Participants were
satisfied, their performance was good in terms of success rates and accuracy, and
they felt that using this type of password was getting easier as they progressed
through the session. The median time required to create (19.1 seconds) and
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confirm a password (7.4 seconds) is acceptable and login times (6.0 seconds) are
reasonable as well. Success rates were high, with 96% of logins being successful.
Users appreciated the implicit feedback. As soon as they saw an unfamiliar
image, they knew they were on the wrong path and restarted. They liked being
able to narrow down exactly which click was erroneous. They also felt that seeing
each image triggered the memory of where they had clicked.
Participants were surprisingly accurate in their targeting of click-points. Dur-
ing the Login phase, 92% of click-points fell within a 9x9 pixel square of the
original click-points. In agreement with our earlier studies with a PassPoints-
style system [3], the accuracy findings for CCP provide further evidence that
tolerance squares as small as of 9x9 pixels may be acceptable terms of usability.
We can also compare results of CCP with our own PassPoints-style user stud-
ies [3]. When comparing only the lab studies, participants performed similarly
well in terms of login accuracy and success rates. The median login click-time
for our PassPoints-style system was 7.0 seconds while for CCP it was 6.0 sec-
onds but CCP’s time also included “think-time” as each image appeared (as
opposed to PassPoints where the majority of “think-time” occurred before the
first click and as such is not included in these click-time results). Of those par-
ticipants who tried both systems, a strong preference for CCP was evident. The
most common reasons were because seeing each image triggered their memory
of their click-point, there was no need to remember the order of the click-points,
and they received implicit feedback about the correctness of their latest click.
This comparison is somewhat biased since users had much more practice with
one system than the other, but these responses do correspond to what would
intuitively be expected.
7.1 Potential Improvements
With any password-based authentication scheme, a primary goal is to maximize
the effective password space (i.e. that subset of the full password space actually
used in practice) in order to make it more resistant to attack. A few alternatives
exist to increase the effective password space for CCP.
Adding More Click-Points. As with PassPoints, one way to increase the
password space is to increase the number of click-points contained in a password.
This comes at the cost of increasing the memory burden on users. Although we
have no empirical evidence to support this hypothesis, it seems that the negative
impact would be less with CCP than with PassPoints since a one-to-one mapping
between images and click-points in CCP would appear to be easier for users to
manage. Therefore moving to 6 click-points may be a reasonable strategy for
CCP. Alternatively it is possible to enforce a minimum number of clicks (images)
but allow users to decide for themselves how many clicks their password contains,
similar to minimum password lengths for text-based passwords. In this case, the
system would continue to show the next image in the sequence but the user would
determine at which point to stop clicking and press the login button. Granted,
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most users would probably pick the minimum length, but a user concerned about
security could build a longer password. If k bits of security are assumed per image
used, then for a password using c images, the security would be c ∗ k.
Adjusting the Image and Tolerance Sizes. A simple way of enlarging the
password space is to use larger images or reduce the tolerance. Both have the
effect of adding squares to the grids. Tolerance cannot be reduced past a certain
threshold because it becomes impossible for users to enter their passwords. Re-
sults of this and our earlier study [3] however indicate that it may be possible
to reduce tolerance more than was originally believed [18] (at least on full-sized
monitors) since users were very accurate in targeting their click-points. For exam-
ple, with images of size 451x331 as used in these studies, there are approximately
400 19x19 pixel grid squares, giving a total password space of 28.6 bits per im-
age. If we reduced the tolerance squares to 9x9 pixels, this would increase to
210.9 bits per image. With CCP, we can multiply by 5 for the number of images
in the password sequence, increasing from 243 to 254.5 bits. Enlargement of the
image is restricted by the size of the screen used. Increasing the size of the image
may also make it more susceptible to shoulder-surfing. Zooming, which has been
suggested elsewhere, including by Wiedenbeck et al. [19] for PassPoints, often
has usability problems of its own, and thus we hesitate to propose it here.
Using a Larger Set of Images. At minimum, the size of CCP’s total image set
should match the number of squares in a tolerance grid (i.e. 400 in our example
system). This strategy would imply that the set of images in the system is re-used
across users and at each stage in the password for each user.
In this case, if users make a mistake during login, there is a small chance
that they accidentally see an image belonging somewhere else in their password
sequence. They may realize the mistake immediately or subsequently when an
unknown next-image appears. The possibility of such collisions can be reduced
or eliminated if the number of images is increased to reduce the overlap between
password stages. However, depending on implementation details, this could im-
ply that the entire sequence could be deduced from knowing only the last image
in a password as discussed below.
As suggested earlier, it is possible to have a larger set of images in the system
and to use a subset for each user. Additionally, the subset for each user may
also hold extra images so that not every image is re-used at each stage. This
can reduce the possibility of collisions during incorrect login. It also increases
the amount of work required by attackers to identify images and determine
hotspots as this work increases proportionally with the number of images used
in the system. If attackers are using a brute-force attack where a dictionary is
built from all possible combinations of images and click-points, then this also
forces a larger dictionary of size totalImages ∗ totalGridSquares ∗ totalClicks.
In comparison, with PassPoints only one image needs to be analyzed per user
and this image is accessible by simply knowing the username.
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If attackers know the image-mapping function f and the set of images used,
then having more images has no effect on the password space beyond requiring
more processing time to determine hotspots. However, even if attackers know f ,
collecting the set of images still poses a challenge because they must either have
insider access to the system or they must discover the images one at a time by
selecting different click-points during login attempts on the particular account.
This can prove time-consuming since the number of unsuccessful login attempts
allowed on a particular account can be restricted (e.g. see [16]). When both f
and the image set are known, the password space is determined by the number
of paths through the image-map tree (generated by f), based on the number of
squares in the tolerance grid, not the number of images available. If a dictionary
was built containing all paths through the tree, the number of entries would be
the same (243 for grids containing 400 squares and 5 clicks) regardless of the
number of images used (although the entries would be different).
In cases where attackers know f and the set of images used, as well as one
or more images in the password (gathered through shoulder-surfing or malware
installed on the client machine), then having a very large set of images for a
given user actually reduces the attacker’s search space (although the amount of
work required for hotspot analysis is still increased). Since not all images will
be used within each image-map, attackers can use this information to eliminate
branches of the image-map tree that do not contain the known image at the
correct stage. At the extreme case where there are no duplicate images, then
knowing the last image of a sequence would identify a unique path through the
tree and reveal the password. Conversely, when all images are re-used at each
stage then no branches can be eliminated and knowing the last image will not
result in a unique path.
Another alternative for increasing the number of images available is to use
larger images but crop them differently for each user. This would complicate
hotspot analysis for attackers because the coordinates of hotspots determined
for one account could not be applied directly to other accounts.
8 Conclusions and Future Work
The proposed Cued Click Points scheme shows promise as a usable and memo-
rable authentication mechanism. By taking advantage of users’ ability to recog-
nize images and the memory trigger associated with seeing a new image, CCP
has advantages over PassPoints in terms of usability. Being cued as each image
is shown and having to remember only one click-point per image appears easier
than having to remember an ordered series of clicks on one image. In our small
comparison group, users strongly preferred CCP.
We believe that CCP offers a more secure alternative to PassPoints. CCP
increases the workload for attackers by forcing them to first acquire image sets
for each user, and then conduct hotspot analysis on each of these images. Fur-
thermore, the system’s flexibility to increase the overall number of images in the
system allows us to arbitrarily increase this workload.
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Future work should include a thorough assessment of the viability of CCP
as an authentication mechanism, including a long term study of how these pass-
words work in practice and whether longer CCP passwords would be usable.
The security of CCP also deserves closer examination, and should address how
attackers might exploit the emergence of hotspots.
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